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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Carolyn Jaffe Andrew*
Abstractor
Arrest, Search and Seizure-Munoz v. United
States, 325 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1963). Defendant was
convicted of narcotics offenses. On appeal, defend-
ant contended that the trial court erred in admit-
ting evidence obtained by unreasonable search and
seizure and statements made by defendant during
unlawful detention in violation of FED. R. ClM. P.
5(a), and in denying defendant's motion to hold a
courtroom demonstration of an electronic device
(a "Fargo Device") which transmits voice by radio.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
versed, holding that where the arresting officers
entered defendant's room with a passkey, provided
by the hotel clerk, immediately after knocking on
the door and announcing their authority and pur-
pose, the officers violated the statute [18 U.S.C.
§3109] providing, inter alia, that an officer may
break in only if refused admittance after giving
notice of authority and purpose, since use of the
passkey amounted to breaking open the door to
defendant's room, and the instantaneous entry
ignored and destroyed the reasons behind the pro-
visions of the statute; that even if the officers had
reasonable grounds to arrest defendant without a
warrant, his arrest and the search of his room
incidental thereto were unlawful because of the
officers' illegal method of entry, and tangible evi-
dence obtained as a result of the search and de-
fendant's post-arrest statements should therefore
have been suppressed; and that where a narcotics
agent testified that he identified defendant's voice
from a few words spoken over an electronic device
worn by an informer during a narcotics transaction,
defendant was entitled to have the jury weigh the
agent's testimony on this point in the light of a
courtroom demonstration of the "Fargo Device."
Arrest, Search and Seizure-United States ex rel.
Linkletter v. Walker, 323 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963).
Petitioner was convicted of burglary in 1959 by a
Louisiana state court, and in 1960 the Louisiana
Supreme Court affirmed and denied rehearing.
* Ford Foundation Fellow in Criminal Law, North-
western University School of Law.
After Mapp v. Ohio was decided, petitioner unsuc-
cessfully applied for state post-conviction remedies,
and his petition for certiorari was denied by the
United States Supreme Court. On appeal from the
federal District Court's denial of his petition for
writ of habeas corpus, petitioner contended that
evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure
was used against him, and that Mapp v. Ohio
applied retroactively to subject his conviction to
collateral attack. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that even if peti-
tioner's arrest without a warrant was lawful, the
search complained of was too geographically re-
mote to be sustained as incident thereto, and was
thus unconstitutional; that since the Mapp opinion
was not clear as to whether that case should be
given retroactive effect and because no subsequent
Supreme Court decision has resolved the question
of Mapp's retroactivity, the instant court was free
to make its own determination of that issue; and
since the purpose of the exclusionary rule of Mapp
was largely to enforce the right of privacy by
deterring illegal official conduct, which purpose
would in no way be served by applying Mapp to
state convictions obtained before Mapp was de-
cided, the rule of Mapp would not be applied to
petitioner, whose state conviction became final
before the Mapp decision. Noting that if the Su-
preme Court intended to restrict the Mapp case to
prospective application it could have, but did not,
say so, Chief Judge Tuttle dissented, stating that
since the exclusionary rule is required by the Con-
stitution, Mapp v. Ohio should be applied to peti-
tioner's case by adherence to the Blackstonian
view-that a court does not pronounce a new law,
but maintains and expounds the old one.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-United States v.
Martin, 223 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. La. 1963). Defend-
ants moved to suppress evidence obtained incident
to their arrests without warrants for narcotics
offenses, contending that the arrests were unlawful
because they were based upon information ob-
tained in violation of defendants' constitutional
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
right of privacy. The District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana denied the motion to sup-
press, holding that for purposes of exclusion of
evidence, the constitutional right of privacy is
violated only by technical trespass; that where the
arresting officers, who were in room #6 of a motel
with the owner's permission, removed the control
panel from a heating unit in the common wall be-
tween rooms #6 and #7 of the motel, and through
this unit overheard conversations among the de-
fendants in room #7 which constituted probable
cause to believe that a narcotics offense was being
committed, the officers did not commit a trespass
against defendants, inasmuch as motel guests were
permitted to remove the panel in order to ignite
the pilot light of the heating unit; and conse-
quently, since the grounds to arrest defendants did
not result from the use of illegal means, the evi-
dence obtained incident to their arrests would not
be suppressed.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-People v. Reeves, 34
Cal. Rptr. 815 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963). Defendants
were convicted of possessing marijuana. On appeal
from the judgments of conviction and from orders
denying their motions for new trial, defendants
contended that marijuana obtained as the result of
an unlawful search and seizure was used as evidence
against them. The California District Court of
Appeal noted that when the trial court overruled
defendants' objection to admission of the evidence,
it did not have the benefit of the subsequently
decided pertinent cases of Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23, abstracted at 54 J. Cmux. L., C. & P.S.
488 (1963), and People v. Haven, 31 Cal. Rptr. 47,
abstracted at 54 J. CRmr. L., C. & P.S. 489 (1963),
and that appellate determination of the instant
case must be made in light of these recent cases.
The California District Court of Appeal reversed,
holding that where police officers, who knew that
defendant Reeves was involved in litigation with
his employer, induced the manager of the hotel
where Reeves was registered to call him on the
telephone and falsely tell him that a letter con-
cerning the litigation was downstairs, the officers'
entry into Reeves' room, effected when Reeves
opened his door to go downstairs to get the non-
existent letter, was unlawful in that the entry was
gained by means of fraud; that assuming arguendo
that the officers had probable cause to arrest
Reeves when they entered his room, the illegality
of their entry vitiated the arrest, and consequently
the ensuing search could not be sustained as inci-
dent thereto; that since the officers did not obtain
consent to search from either defendant until after
the unlawful entry, this consent could not be relied
upon to sustain the search and seizure, inasmuch
as the consent was a product of the officers' illegal
conduct; and consequently, the search and seizure
was "fruit of the poisonous tree" of entry gained
by trick, and evidence obtained by means thereof
should have been suppressed.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-People v. Bowen,
194 N.E.2d 316 (Ill. 1963). Defendant was con-
victed of unlawful possession of narcotics under two
separate indictments. On writ of error to review
both judgments, defendant contended that the
trial court erroneously denied his motions to sup-
press unlawfully seized narcotics upon which both
convictions were based. The Supreme Court of
Illinois reversed the judgment on one indictment
and affirmed judgment on the other, holding that
although a search of defendant to ascertain whether
he was armed, conducted when he was found in
the presence of his wife who had just been lawfully
arrested without a warrant, was reasonable and
lawful as incident to the wife's arrest, a further,
more thorough search of defendant at that time
which revealed heroin in the fly of his trousers was
not reasonably necessary to protect the officers
from attack and thus could not be sustained as
incident to the wife's arrest; that the search of
defendant on another occasion was lawful as inci-
dent to his arrest without warrant, which arrest
was lawful because, on the basis of information
from a reliable informer [that defendant was at a
certain place selling narcotics] and personal knowl-
edge [that defendant was involved in narcotics],
the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that defendant was committing a crime when
the officer discovered him at the location indicated
by the informer; and consequently, the trial court
should have granted defendant's motion to sup-
press the heroin found in his fly pursuant to the
search of his person conducted when his wife was
arrested, but correctly overruled defendant's
motion to suppress the narcotics found as a result
of the search incident to his arrest.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-State v. Nelson, 196
A.2d 52 (N.H. 1963). Defendants were convicted
of murder. On exceptions to the trial court's denial
of their motions -for new trial, defendants con-
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tended that Mapp v. Ohio rendered inadmissible
tangible evidence taken from them while they were
unlawfully detained for 54 hours and denied the
right to confer with counsel for 56 hours. Noting
that since Mapp, which changed the New Hamp-
shire law on admissibility of illegally seized evi-
dence, was decided after defendants' trial, their
failure to object below to introduction of the evi-
dence now complained of was understandable and
would not preclude appellate consideration of the
question, the New Hampshire Supreme Court over-
ruled defendants' exceptions, holding that regard-
less of whether defendants' arrests and detentions
were unlawful, and regardless of denial by the
authorities of their requests to confer with counsel,
there was no search, since the evidence complained
of, consisting entirely of articles of clothing from
both defendants and dirt from under the fingernails
of one defendant, was readily visible and accessible
to the police, and there was no seizure, since, there
being no claim of official force or coercion, all the
evidence was voluntarily turned over by defend-
ants. The Court noted that the evidence in question
was voluntarily relinquished physical evidence
rather than oral confessions. Chief Justice Kenison
dissented.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-State v. Mercurio,
194 A.2d 574 (R.I. 1963). Defendant husband and
wife were convicted of gambling violations. On bill
of exceptions, defendants contended that the trial
court erroneously denied their motions to suppress
tangible evidence and statements obtained follow-
ing their unlawful arrests. The Supreme Court of
Rhode Island sustained the exceptions and re-
mitted to the Superior Court for new trial, holding
that defendants' arrests were effected when a police
officer entered their car, which was stopped at an
intersection for a red light, and directed defendant
husband to drive to police headquarters; that the
arrests without warrant were invalid for lack of
probable cause, since to the arresting officer's
knowledge, no misdemeanor had been committed
in his presence; that R.I. GEN. LAws §12-7-3
(1956), which purports to authorize a peace officer
to arrest for a misdemeanor without a warrant
when a misdemeanor has in fact been committed
in the officer's presence, whether or not the officer
had reasonable cause so to believe, was an invalid
legislative attempt to abrogate the common law
test, which was the basis for the constitutional
standard against illegal arrest, and substitute
therefor an unwarranted interference with per-
sonal liberty, so the arrests could not be sustained
by authority of §12-7-3; and consequently, all
evidence taken and elicited from defendants at the
time of their unlawful arrests-statements as well
as tangible evidence--should have been suppressed.
The court cited Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, abstracted at 54 J. Caim. L., C. & P.S.
189 (1963), as authority for its ultimate holding.
Cautionary Instructions-State v. Jones, 124
N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1963). See Improper Conduct
by Prosecutor, infra.
Confessions-Lee v. United States, 322 F.2d 770
(5th Cir. 1963). Defendant was convicted of con-
spiracy to import and distribute heroin. On appeal,
defendant contended that the District Court er-
roneously admitted evidence of his post-indictment
confession obtained in jail during a secret police
interrogation without counsel. Without determin-
ing the voluntariness of defendant's statements,
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed
and remanded, holding that where defendant was
secretly interrogated in jail 15 days after his post-
indictment arrest and without having at any time
conferred with counsel, the investigating officers'
testimony regarding defendant's alleged oral ad-
missions must be held inadmissible in exercise of
the appellate court's supervisory power over the
administration of federal criminal justice. Noting
that secret questioning of one already indicted
could not be justified as necessary police interro-
gation of a suspect, the Court stated that defend-
ant's right to counsel arose, at the very latest, upon
indictment, and that waiver of defendant's right to
counsel could not be presumed from the record's
silence on the issue. Judge Hutcheson voiced a
vigorous dissent.
Confessions-Munoz v. United States, 325 F.2d
23 (9th Cir. 1963). See Arrest, Search and Seizure,
supra.
Confessions-People v. Sigal, 34 Cal. Rptr. 767
(Dist. Ct. App. 1963). Defendant was convicted of
second degree murder. On appeal, defendant con-
tended that his involuntary confession was used
as evidence against him in violation of due process.
The District Court of Appeal of California re-
versed, holding that although the statements in
question, which depicted defendant as assisting
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one "George" (whose existence was not proved) to
commit the crime, were intended by defendant to
be exculpatory, the "George story" was in fact a
confession since it was treated by the prosecution
and the trial court as an admission of defendant's
guilt, and must therefore be treated as a confession
for purposes of determining its admissibility; that
since defendant was more than a mere suspect,
having been arrested for a capital offense on the
basis of a warrant and a verified complaint, his
interrogation by police officers was not a neutral
inquiry designed to further investigation of an
unsolved crime, but rather was designed to get in-
criminating statements from one already accused
of murder; that under California law, defendant,
as an "accused," had a right to counsel as of the
time the interrogation commenced; and where
defendant's request for counsel was denied by the
interrogating officers on 20 different occasions dur-
ing some 12 hours of intermittent questioning over
a 60 hour period, the denial of his right to counsel
in violation of due process was a "coercive circum-
stance without which the confession would not
have been produced," and resulted in fundamental
unfairness which infected defendant's subsequent
trial; and consequently, use of the confession
against defendant constituted a violation of his
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of
law.
Confessions-People v. Donovan, 193 N.E.2d
628 (N.Y. 1963). Defendants Donovan and
Mencher were convicted of first degree murder. On
appeal, defendants contended that Donovan's
written confession should not have been admitted
against them, since it was obtained during Dono-
van's unlawful detention and after his request to
confer with counsel was denied. Without decision as
to the requirements imposed upon the State by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Court of Appeals of New York reversed and
ordered a new trial as to each defendant, holding
that the State's constitutional and statutory pro-
visions regarding the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, right to counsel, and due process demanded
exclusion of Donovan's written confession, which
was obtained after police interrogation while he
was being detained in violation of the New York
prompt arraignment statute and after the police
had refused to allow his retained counsel to speak
with him; that improper admission of Donovan's
confession required reversal of his conviction re-
gardless of the presence of strong, independent
evidence of guilt, since it may have contributed to
the verdict; and since the confession improperly
before the jury implicated defendant Mencher as
well, his conviction must also be reversed in the
interests of justice. The Court noted that right to
counsel and privilege against self-incrimination
converge in the instant type of case, inasmuch as
"one of the most important protections which
counsel can confer while his client is being detained
by the authorities is to preserve his client's privi-
lege against self incrimination .... " Further,
stated the Court, "Weighty though such considera-
tions [that to permit a suspect to confer with
counsel before talking to the police would preclude
effective, essential police interrogation] may be,
they do not permit us to ignore rights due the
accused under our law." Three of the seven Judges
dissented.
Confessions-State v. lfercurio, 194 A.2d 574
(R.I. 1963). See Arrest, Search and Seizure, supra.
Confessions-Rodriguez v. State, 373 S.W.2d 490
(Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1963). Defendant was con-
victed of murder. On appeal, defendant contended
that exclusion of the testimony of one Hermasillo
that after being subjected to police brutality by
the same officers to whom defendant confessed,
Hermasillo had confessed to the same crime con-
stituted reversible error, since his testimony tended
to prove defendant's contention that his confession
was coerced and should not have been used as
evidence against him. The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that
where there was photographic and testimonial
evidence that defendant had been physically
coerced into confessing and where both defendant
and Hermasillo had been interrogated in the same
wing of the same building by some of the same
officers, the similarity of the circumstances of the
interrogations as related by defendant and Herma-
sillo was so striking that the jury could reasonably
have believed that the officers followed this prac-
tice in securing confessions; and consequently,
evidence of the brutality inflicted upon Hermasillo
which produced an apparently false confession
should have been admitted, since it would have
been of utmost importance to the jury in determin-
ing whether defendant's confession was coerced.
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Contributory Negligence-State v. Harrington,
133 S.E.2d 452 (N.C. 1963). See Homicide-
Proximate Cause, infra.
Court Costs-Commonwealth v. Giaccio, 196 A.2d
189 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1963). Defendantiwas acquitted
of the misdemeanor of wantonly pointing and dis-
charging a firearm, but was sentenced to pay the
costs of prosecution. On appeal by the Common-
wealth from an order of the Court of Quarter
Sessions of Chester County vacating the sentence
to pay the costs, defendant contended that the
statute authorizing a jury acquitting one of a mis-
demeanor to assess him for part or all of the costs
[PA. STAT. tit. 19, §1222] was unconstitutional. The
Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed and rein-
stated the sentence to pay costs, holding that since
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had twice upheld
the constitutionality of the provision in question,
the Superior Court had no standing to overrule
that holding; but that in any event, the statute
did not violate due process, since assessment of
costs is not a penalty, and because every misde-
meanor defendant is on notice that costs may be
imposed even if he is acquitted, has an opportunity
to be heard on the question of costs, and has a right
to challenge a verdict imposing costs. Justice Flood
dissented, stating that the cost provision was un-
constitutional, since it was, in effect, a penal
statute which failed to describe the conduct which
will subject an acquitted misdemeanor defendant
to this penalty.
Crime by Telephone-State v. Leozard, 124
N.W.2d 429 (Iowa 1963). See Obscenity, infra.
Cross-Examination-State v. Solven, 371 S.W.2d
328 (Mo. 1963). See Witnesses, infra.
Demonstrative Evidence-Munoz v. United
States, 325 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1963). See Arrest,
Search and Seizure, supra.
Derivative Evidence-Smith v. United States,
324 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1963). Defendants were
convicted of murder and robbery. On appeal, de-
fendants contended that the District Court erred
in receiving the testimony of one Holman, since
the police found this eye-witness as the result of
information obtained from defendants while they
were being illegally detained in violation of FED.
R. CRIm. P. 5(a). Noting that the District Court
properly suppressed the tangible evidence and con-
fessions obtained from defendants during their
illegal detention, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, holding that
since an individual's personal attributes of will,
perception, memory, and volition all determine
what testimony he will give, mere disclosure to
police of the name of a potential witness is of no
evidentiary significance per se; that the proffer of a
living witness whose identity was discovered dur-
ing defendants' illegal detention would therefore
not be equated with the proffer of illegally seized
inanimate evidentiary objects for purposes of ap-
plying the "fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine;
and consequently, the District Court correctly
permitted Holman to testify against defendants.
Chief Judge Bazelon dissented, stating that Hol-
man was located as a direct result of the illegal
questioning of defendants, and that admission of
Holman's testimony "puts a premium on violation
of Rule 5(a) and provides an incentive for con-
tinuing to violate it."
Diminished Responsibility-People v. Hender-
son, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963). See Insanity, infra.
Discovery-State v. Richards, 124 N.E.2d 684
(Wis. 1963). Defendants were convicted of armed
robbery and concealing identity. On appeal, de-
fendants contended that the trial court's denial of
their request for production of any prior statements
made by a prosecution witness to police officers was
prejudicial error. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
reversed and remanded, with instructions that the
trial court order production of the witness's state-
ments, if any, and determine whether they are in-
consistent or at variance with her direct testimony;
if they are, a new trial should be ordered so that
the defense may use the prior statements to im-
peach the witness; if they are not, a new judgment
should be entered on the guilty verdict. The Court
held that the reasoning and policy underlying
Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), would
be applied, and concluded that a criminal defend-
ant is entitled to inspect prior statements made by
prosecution witnesses to the authorities, insofar as
the statements concern the subject matter of the
witness's direct testimony and are written or
signed by the witness or given orally and steno-
graphically or mechanically transcribed. The Court
outlined a procedure by which the discovery de-
scribed would be effected.
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Discovery-Jencks Act-Ogden v. United States,
323 F.2d 818 (9th Cir. 1963). Defendant was con-
victed of a federal offense, and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded
to permit the District Court to determine whether
certain notes taken by FBI agents during an
interview of Government witness Glass were a
"statement" within the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C.
§3500, and, if so, what became of them and what
consequences should follow the Government's
failure to produce them. 303 F.2d 724 (9th Cir.
1962). The District Court found that the notes
were a "statement"; that after transcribing into a
typed statement signed by Glass the substance of
notes taken by an FBI agent during an interview
with Glass, the agent destroyed the notes in good
faith and in accordance with FBI practice; and
that since the information contained in the notes
was available to defendant in the form of the typed
statement, a new trial was not required. On appeal,
defendant [apparently] contended that he was
entitled to the original notes under the Jencks
Act. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, holding that where the material contained
in the interview notes was made available to de-
fendant in a statement signed by the witness,
destruction of the notes in accordance with normal
administrative practice for normal administrative
purposes unrelated to the suppression of evidence
did not justify the imposition of sanctions against
the Government or the granting of a new trial.
Double Jeopardy-People v. Henderson, 35 Cal.
Rptr. 77 (1963). See Insanity, in fra.
Double Jeopardy-People v. Laws, 193 N.E.2d
806 (MI1. 1963), dissenting opinion at 195 N.E.2d
393. Defendant was convicted of unlawful sale of
narcotics. On writ of error, defendant contended
that the trial court erroneously denied his motion
for discharge on grounds of former jeopardy. The
Supreme Court of Illinois reversed, holding that
where, after the prosecution had rested its case,
defendant's former trial for the same offense had
terminated in declaration of mistrial, on motion of
the prosecution and over defendant's objection, on
the sole ground that defendant had never entered a
plea, the trial court erred in declaring a mistrial,
inasmuch as entry of a plea is not a prerequisite
for a valid judgment; that since jeopardy attaches
when a defendant is charged with a crime
and the court begins to hear evidence, defendant's
former trial constituted jeopardy; and conse-
quently, since declaration of mistrial was im-
proper and defendant was placed in jeopardy
by the former trial, defendant's motion for dis-
charge on ground of former jeopardy should have
been granted. The Court noted that apparently
neither the trial court nor the prosecution was
aware of People v. Hill, 160 N.E.2d 779 (fl. 1959),
which held that entry of a formal plea was not
essential to a valid judgment. In an opinion written
by Judge Schaefer, printed at 195 N.E.2d 393,
three Judges dissented, stating that since defendant
was largely responsible for the "procedural snarl"
that resulted in the mistrial, the convicting trial
court properly overruled defendant's claim of
double jeopardy.
Double Jeopardy-Commonwealth v. Baker, 196
A.2d 382 (Pa. 1964). Defendant was indicted for
murder, and the trial court sustained his plea of
double jeopardy as to the charge of murder in the
first degree only, and continued the case to permit
the Commonwealth to appeal. On appeal by the
Commonwealth, defendant contended that since a
former trial for first degree murder for the same
offense terminated in a mistrial, declared by the
trial judge over objection of the Commonwealth
and without either consent or objection of the
defendant, he could not again be tried for first
degree murder for commission of the same act. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the order
sustaining defendant's plea of double jeopardy,
directing that his trial on the present indictment
be limited to offenses other than first degree mur-
der, holding that since the trial judge dismissed the
jury at the first sign of disagreement after the
jurors had been deliberating only a short period of
time (one evening and one morning), the judge de-
clared the mistrial before there was any absolute
necessity or realistic justification to do so; that
defendant's silence did not amount to consent to
the discharge of the jury or constitute waiver of
his right to claim double jeopardy; and therefore,
since defendant did not consent to the erroneous
declaration of mistrial, subsequent trial for first
degree murder for the same offense must be pro-
hibited as constituting double jeopardy. Regarding
the Commonwealth's contention that defendant
should nonetheless be triable for first degree murder
if the penalty be limited to life imprisonment, the
Court noted that under Pennsylvania law, a jury
could impose the 'death penalty for first degree
1964]
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murder irrespective of recommendation of the
district attorney or the court.
Due Process of Law-Barrett v. United States,
322 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1963). Defendants were con-
victed on three counts relating to illegal distilling.
On appeal, defendants contended that the District
Court's instructions to the jury, which incor-
porated the statutory presumptions of guilt [26
U.S.C. §5601(b)] arising upon proof of presence at
an illegal still, deprived defendants of Fifth Amend-
ment due process. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded as to Counts
1 and 2 and reversed as to Count 3, holding that
where the statutory presumptions-that presence
at the site of an unregistered still is presumptive
evidence of possession thereof and of carrying on a
distillery business without bond-provided that
proof of presence alone was sufficient evidence to
authorize conviction unless the defendant ex-
plained his presence to the satisfaction of the jury,
these provisions in effect coerce an accused to take
the stand despite the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination and upset the scheme of
criminal jurisprudence based upon burden of
proof beyond reasonable doubt upon the prosecu-
tion and presumed innocence of the defendant;
that regardless of the convenience afforded to the
prosecuting government by a statutory presump-
tion, such a presumption is valid under the due
process clause only if proof of the fact upon which
the statutory presumption is based carries a
reasonable inference of the ultimate fact presumed;
that the ultimate fact of guilt presumed by the
provisions in question was not sufficiently related
to the fact of presence to satisfy this due process
test; and consequently, the District Court's in-
corporation of the statutory presumptions into the
instruction on Counts 1 and 2 deprived defendants
of their constitutional right to due process of law,
and the convictions on these counts must be re-
versed and remanded for new trial in the interests
of justice even though there was sufficient evidence
notwithstanding the unconstitutional presump-
tions to support the verdicts, since the jury may
have relied on the presumptions. The Court re-
versed as to the third count for lack of any evidence
of the essential element of intent to defraud.
Due Process of Law-Nelson v. State, 387 P.2d
933 (Alaska 1964). Defendant was convicted of the
misdemeanor of killing a cub grizzly bear in viola-
tion of a state game regulation promulgated by the
Board of Fish and Game. On appeal, defendant
contended that enforcement against him of the
regulation, even when supplemented by another
regulation defining "cub bear" as "young bear in
their first or second year of life," deprived defend-
ant of due process of law, since he had no way of
knowing that the bear he shot was less than two
years old. The Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed,
holding that since it was admittedly impossible
for a hunter to ascertain the precise age of a wild
bear, to require proof of guilty knowledge for con-
viction would render the regulation unenforcible,
and thus would frustrate the Board's permissible
objective of providing for the protection and propa-
gation of bear; and inasmuch as a hunter, knowing
that the size of a bear is some indication of its age,
will have knowingly allowed himself little margin
for error in his age estimate if he shoots a relatively
small bear, the fact that the hunter's fate depends
on the accuracy of his estimation presents no con-
stitutional problem.
Due Process of Law-People v. Lewis, 194
N.E.2d 831 (N.Y. 1963); State v. Brown, 196 A.2d
133 (R.I. 1963). See Traffic Violations, infra.
Equal Protection of the Laws-Smith v. Crouse,
386 P.2d 295 (Kan. 1963).
Expert Witnesses-State v. Carroll, 123 N.W.2d
659 (N.D. 1963). Defendant was convicted of
arson. On appeal, defendant contended, inter alia,
that in permitting an "expert witness" to give his
opinion as to the cause of the fire, the trial court
permitted an invasion of the province of the jury
which constituted reversible error. The Supreme
Court of North Dakota affirmed, holding that
where the witness, a special agent for the National
Board of Fire Underwriters with both academic
study and practical experience in the investigation
of fires, who was qualified as an expert in the field of
investigating fires, had made a careful examination
of the premises of the fire in question, his experience
caused his opinion to be of appreciable help to the
jury in a field where the ordinary juror needs help;
and that consequently, the witness's opinion
that the fire was "caused by human hands" was
properly admitted in evidence.
Felony Murder-Johnson v. State, 3 86 P.2d 336
(Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1963). Defendant was con-
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victed of premeditated death, resulting from the
commission of a felony. On appeal, defendant con-
tended that since it was not established that the
deceased police officer was killed by defendant or
by his co-conspirator, defendant was not criminally
responsible for the officer's death. The Court of
Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma affirmed, holding
that even if the deceased officer was killed by a
bullet fired by another police officer rather than by
defendant or his co-conspirator, defendant was
criminally responsible for his death, inasmuch as
when defendant used a gun to commit assault de-
signed to produce injury or death of the officers who
were attempting to prevent his escape from the
scene of a burglary, the fact that the deceased
officer may have been killed by a shot fired by his
partner in spontaneous and instinctive retaliation
against defendant's armed attack did not absolve
defendant of criminal liability, since the retaliatory
force resulting in death of the officer was not the
product of any intervening cause, but rather was
caused by defendant's assault; and consequently,
even if the deceased officer's fellow officer fired the
fatal shot, defendant was properly convicted. The
Court was careful to limit the application of the
decision to the facts of the instant case.
Freedom of Religion-People v. Woody, 35 Cal.
Rptr. 708 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963). Defendant
Navajo Indians were convicted of unlawful posses-
sion of peyote in violation of CAL. IIEAzTji &
SAFETY CODE §11500. On appeal, defendants con-
tended that the statute violated their right freely
to exercise their religion, which involves the sacra-
mental use of peyote. The California District Court
of Appeal affirmed, holding that since peyote was a
hallucinogen with toxic, deleterious, and intoxicat-
ing effects, it was a proper subject of regulation
under the State's police power; that defendants
were free to believe that peyote was of divine ori-
gin, since the statute regulated only their freedom
to act upon their beliefs, not their freedom to be-
lieve; that since serious evils reasonably certain to
result from the unprescribed use of peyote were
apparent, a police power statute regarding peyote
could constitutionally abridge defendants' right to
act pursuant to their religious beliefs even if the
anticipated dangers of peyote were not temporally
immediate; that absence of an exclusionary provi-
sion permitting possession of peyote for religious
use did not render the statute unconstitutional as
not being reasonably related to the object it sought
to achieve, particularly since a claim of possession
for religious use would be extremely easy to make
and hard to disprove; that the statute's interfer-
ence with the exercise of defendants' religious prac-
tice was its incidental effect rather than intended
purpose; and consequently, the statute was consti-
tutional as a reasonable exercise of the police power
which did not constitute an unconstitutional in-
fringement upon the defendants' right to freedom
of religion.
Freedom of Speech-State v. Leonard, 124
N.W.2d 429 (Iowa 1963). See Obscenity, infra.
Freedom of the Press-State v. Hdtson County
News Co., 196 A.2d 225 (N.J. 1963). See Obscenity,
infra.
Guilty Plea-Coercion-Letters v. Commm-
wealth, 193 N.E.2d 578 (Mass. 1963). Petitioners
pleaded guilty and were convicted of various of-
fenses. On writ of error, petitioners contended that
their pleas of guilty had not been voluntarily
entered. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts expunged both guilty pleas and reversed and
remanded, holding that where petitioners' pleas
were induced by threats by the trial judge, com-
municated to petitioners by their attorneys, that
if they elected to stand trial and were convicted,
maximum sentences to run consecutively would be
imposed, the guilty pleas were coerced and must be
expunged. The Court noted that the pleas were
induced by threat of punishment for exercising the
basic constitutional right to a trial, and that this
constituted a significant invasion of that right.
Habeas Corpus-Commonwealth ex rel. Wilson v.
Rulndle, 194 A.2d 143 (Pa. 1963). See Search and
Seizure, infra.
Homicide-Proximate Cause-State v. Shephard,
124 N.W.2d 712 (Iowa 1963). See Search and
Seizure-Waiver by Spouse, infra.
Homicide-Proximate Cause-DeVaughn v.
State, 194 A.2d 109 (Md. 1963). Defendant was
convicted of first degree murder by the trial court
sitting without a jury. On appeal, defendant con-
tended that the decedent's death was caused not by
defendant's shooting of him three weeks earlier but
by an independent, supervening cause consisting
either of negligent medical treatment or an infec-
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tion or disease unrelated to the gunshot wound.
Noting that the question of supervening cause was
a novel one in Maryland, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland affirmed, holding that even if there was
evidence of improper medical treatment, defend-
ant was not for this reason legally excused, since
improper treatment is one of the possible conse-
quences which might follow infliction of injury
and which the guilty party must be deemed to
have contemplated and be responsible for; and
even if the victim died from the combined effects
of the gunshot wound and an independent disease,
defendant was not thereby relieved of responsi-
bility, since the injury he inflicted contributed to
and hence was a direct cause of death.
Homicide-Proximate Cause-State v. Harring-
ton, 133 S.E.2d 452 (N.C. 1963). Defendant was
convicted of involuntary manslaughter for killing
two children with his car while attempting to pass
another vehicle, and the trial court reinstated a
former suspended sentence for a prior conviction
of involuntary manslaughter. On appeal, defendant
contended that the trial court's refusal to instruct
the jury that a statute required pedestrians walk-
ing on a highway to yield the right of way to
approaching traffic was prejudicial error. The Su-
preme Court of North Carolina vacated the judg-
ment activating the suspended sentence and
ordered a new trial, holding that although con-
tributory negligence is no defense in a criminal
action, defendant was entitled to the requested
instruction, since the criminal act with which
defendant was charged was manslaughter by
reason of his alleged culpable negligence, and the
negligence of the persons fatally injured was rele-
vant and material to the question of proximate
cause. The Court added that with regard to the
same question, defendant was also entitled to have
the jury consider whether the conduct of the driver
of the vehicle he attempted to pass, either alone
or in combination with any contributory negli-
gence on the part of the persons killed, was the
proximate cause of death.
Implied Consent Laws-Walton v. City of
Roanoke, 133 S.E.2d 315 (Va. 1963). See Self-
Incrimination, infra.
Improper Conduct by Prosecutor-State v. Jones,
124 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1963). Defendant was
convicted of rape. On appeal, defendant contended
that he was prejudiced by the trial court's refusal
to declare a mistrial which he requested on the
basis of the prosecutor's improper argument in
summation that "Society is not safe with a man
like that.... It could be your daughter,.., it
could be somebody else's wife.... IT]he next girl
he sees might be my daughter, my wife, or some-
body else's daughter or wife.... [and that if
found not guilty, defendant would be able to say]
'The jury turned me loose so I can do it again.'"
The Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed and
granted a new trial, holding that in light of the
county attorney's position of respect in the com-
munity, the argument, implying that defendant's
acquittal would expose the jurors' loved ones to
possible rape, was so prejudicial that its harmful
effect could not have been obviated by the trial
court's corrective cautionary instruction to disre-
gard the statements.
Indictment and Information-Dawall v. State,
156 So. 2d 769 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963). See
Statutory Construction-Burglary, infra.
Indictment and Information-People v. Peck,
194 N.E.2d 245 (Ill. 1963). See Statutory Con-
struction-Burglary, infra.
Insanity-People v. Henderson, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77
(1963). Defendant was convicted of first degree
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On
appeal, the District Court of Appeal reversed and
remanded. On retrial, defendant was again con-
victed and the jury fixed the penalty at death. On
automatic appeal, defendant contended that the
trial court's failure to give a sua sponte instruction
on the defense of diminished responsibility was
prejudicial error, and that the prohibition against
double jeopardy precluded imposition of the death
sentence on retrial after the judgment sentencing
him to life imprisonment for the same offense was
reversed. The Supreme Court of California re-
versed, holding that a trial court was required to
give an unrequested instruction if failure so to in-
struct had the effect of removing a significant issue
in the trial from the jury; that the defense of
mental illness not amounting to legal insanity was
a significant issue in defendant's case, since under
this "diminished responsibility" rule, one legally
sane but suffering from a mental illness which
prevented him from being capable of acting with
malice aforethought cannot be convicted of first
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degree murder, and there was substantial evidence
raising the availability of that defense; and conse-
quently, since defendant was deprived of the right
to a jury determination of the only real issue in the
case, the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on
the law of diminished responsibility constituted
reversible error. Noting that defendant's double
jeopardy contention may arise on retrial, the Court
considered the claim, stating that the State consti-
tutional provision against double jeopardy pro-
hibited imposition of the death penalty upon re-
trial after reversal of a judgment upon which only
a sentence of life imprisonment was imposed, since
the more severe penalty was analogous to a higher
degree of crime, and the guarantee against double
jeopardy prohibits conviction of a higher degree of
crime upon retrial after reversal of a conviction of
the lower degree. The Court specifically overruled
People v. Grill, 91 Pac. 515 (Cal. 1907), and noted
that the State had no interest in preserving er-
roneous judgments, and "a defendant's right to
appeal from an erroneous judgment is unreasonably
impaired when he is required to risk his life to
invoke that right." Two Judges dissented.
Jury's Knowledge of Possible Consequences of
Their Verdict-People v. Morse, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201
(1964). See Sentencing, infra.
Jury's Knowledge of Possible Consequences of
Their Verdict-Burnelle v. State, 157 So. 2d 65
(Fla. 1963). See Sentencing, infra.
Mandamus-Riley t'. Garrett, 133 S.E.2d 367
(Ga. 1963). See Statutory Construction-Sodomy,
infra.
Narcotics-People v. Zapata, 34 Cal. Rptr. 171
(Dist. Ct. App. 1963). Defendant was convicted of
possession of heroin in violation of CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §11500. On appeal, defendant con-
tended that since the quantity of heroin which he
was convicted of possessing was not large enough
to indicate possession for any purpose other than
for his own use and to satisfy his own compulsive
craving, his conviction constituted an attempt by
the State indirectly to punish him for being an
addict and thus was invalid under Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, abstracted at 53 J. CRIr.
L., C. & P.S. 492 (1962) (punishment for status of
being an addict violates federal constitutional
guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment).
The District Court of Appeal of California af-
firmed, holding that dictum in the Robinson case
[e.g., "A state might impose criminal sanctions...
against... possessing of narcotics within its
borders"] demonstrated that Robinson did not
necessarily imply that punishment for addiction-
induced possession of narcotics would constitute
cruel and unusual punishment; and that even if
defendant's possession was related only to his own
addiction, the State could validly punish the pos-
session, inasmuch as his overt act of possessing
narcotics, not his craving, was penalized.
Obscenity-State v. Leonard, 124 N.W.2d 429
(Iowa 1963). Defendant was convicted of publicly
using obscene language to the disturbance of the
public peace and quiet in violation of IowA CoDE
§728.1. On appeal, defendant contended that evi-
dence that he said "I'll punch you in the nose, you
son-of-a-bitch," in a telephone call from his home
to the city clerk in the clerk's private office, failed
to establish the three necessary elements of the
offense. The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed,
holding that since "obscene" within the statute in-
cluded not only material which aroused prurient
interests but also that which was offensive, abusive,
disgusting, and revolting, the phrase "son-of-a-
bitch" was obscene for purposes of the statute;
that even if the clerk's private office was not a
public place, defendant's use of the obscene lan-
guage was public within the scope of the statute,
inasmuch as defendant spoke so loudly that a
witness in the clerk's outer office, unquestionably
a public place, overheard the obscene words; that
the court could not say as a matter of law that use
of the term "son-of-a-bitch" under the circum-
stances did not disturb the public peace and quiet;
and consequently, since there was sufficient evi-
dence to support each of the three necessary ele-
ments of the offense, defendant's conviction
must be affirmed. Justice Thornton dissented,
stating that under the rule of strict construction of
penal statutes, "obscene" did not include that
which was vulgar but did not appeal to prurient
interests.
Obscenity-State v. Hudson County News Co.,
196 A.2d 225 (N.J. 1963). Defendants were con-
victed of possession with intent to sell and sale
of obscene magazines, and the Appellate Division
of the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed. On
appeal, defendants contended, inter alia, that the
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procedures used by the police in confiscating maga-
zines from their warehouse constituted a prior
restraint and deprived them of First and Four-
teenth Amendment rights; and that an erroneous
standard for determining obscenity was applied
in the trial of the case. The Supreme Court of
New Jersey reversed the possession convictions
and vacated and remanded the convictions of
sale, holding that where the seizing officers, who
had a warrant to search defendants' warehouse for
books of obscene nature, were provided no guide
to the exercise of informed discretion but were
left to their individual judgment, which of neces-
sity was exercised on the basis of on-the-spot,
ad hoc decisions, as to which magazines were ob-
scene, and where, as a result of the seizures, 600
magazines not subsequently found obscene were
withheld from the market for approximately
three years, the procedures imposed an uncon-
stitutional prior restraint upon defendants' First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights; that because
this violation permeated the proceedings under
the indictment for possession, the convictions
entered on that indictment must be reversed with-
out remand; that since the First Amendment
accepts for the nation as a whole the basic idea
that freedom of expression is a necessary guarantee
in a democratic society, the standard to be applied
in holding certain expressions outside that amend-
ment's protection cannot operate in such a way
as to alter the degree of protection from locality
to locality; that the "contemporary community
standard" to be applied under the New Jersey
obscenity statute must therefore be the national
standard of the contemporary society of the United
States of America at large rather than that of any
specific locality; and that consequently, the trial
court's instruction that the jury should consider
the community standards of Hudson County as
testified to by witnesses permitted the jury to
convict defendants for sale of magazines not within
the constitutionally permissible definition of ob-
scenity, and the convictions for sale must be
vacated and remanded for a new trial at which the
national contemporary community standard must
be applied. The Court noted that the unconstitu-
tional procedure by which the material was
seized was indistinguishable from that found con-
stitutionally defective by the United States Su-
preme Court in Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367
U.S. 717, abstracted at 52 J. CIMs. L., C. & P.S.
429 (1961).
Opinion Evidence-State v. Carroll, 123 N.W.2d
659 (N.D. 1963). See Expert Witnesses, supra.
Pardon and Parole-Riley v. Garrett, 133 S.E.2d
367 (Ga. 1963). See Statutory Construction-
Sodomy, infra.
Police Power-People v. Woody, 35 Cal. Rptr.
708 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963). See Freedom of Re.
ligion, supra.
Prejudicial Publicity-United States v. Kline,
221 F. Supp. 776 (D. Minn. 1963); State v. St.
Peter, 387 P.2d 937 (Wash. 1963). Two recent
cases point up a possible method for handling the
problem of prejudicial publicity at the trial level
without resorting to the contempt process or to
subsequent reversal.
In United States v. Kline, defendants contended,
inter alia, that denial of their motion for a change
of venue, based upon prejudicial publicity, resulted
in denial of their right to a fair trial. The District
Court for the District of Minnesota denied de-
fendants' motions for new trial or for acquittal,
holding that where the pre-trial publicity com-
plained of was published two years before trial,
the court excused every prospective juror who had
formed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of
defendants, and the publicity circulated during
the trial, which the jurors denied having read or
heard, contained no matters not admitted as evi-
dence in court, denial of defendants' motion for
change of venue was not prejudicial to their right
to a fair trial by an impartial jury.
In State v. St. Peter, the Washington Supreme
Court affirmed defendant's conviction over his
contention that, due to prejudicial publicity, the
trial court's denial of his motion for continuance
or change of venue was prejudicial error. The
court noted that all potential jurors who had read
or heard of defendant were excused.
[It appears that such limitation of jurors (in
Kline, excusing those who had formed an opinion;
in St. Peter, those who had read or heard of de-
fendant) is an effective, if not the only, way to
guarantee a fair and impartial trial to a defendant
who has received substantial press coverage.]
Right to Counsel-Hardy v. United States, 84
Sup. Ct. 424 (1964). After petitioner was con-
victed of a federal offense, his court-appointed
counsel withdrew with the court's approval.
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Petitioner's pro se petition for leave to appeal in
forma pauperis was denied by the District Court
for the District of Columbia, and the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
after appointing a different attorney to represent
petitioner, granted leave to proceed informa paw-
perns, but limited the transcript to be prepared at
Government expense to those portions relating to
the conclusory allegations formulated by petitioner
pro se. Petitioner's subsequent application for
rehearing and motion for a transcript of the bal-
ance of the trial proceedings were denied. On
certiorari, petitioner contended that since his
court-appointed appellate counsel did not repre-
sent him at trial, the entire transcript was required
in order for counsel properly to prosecute the
appeal. In an opinion, per Douglas, J., announcing
the judgment of the Court, the United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that since the
duty of counsel on appeal is not to serve as amicus
to the Court of Appeals but as advocate for the
appellant, and in light of the fact that under
FED. R. Cam . P. 52(b) an appellate court may
notice "plain errors," the obligation of a court-
appointed appellate counsel who did not represent
an indigent at the trial cannot be faithfully dis-
charged unless he can read the entire transcript;
and consequently, petitioner's counsel's duty
could not be discharged unless he had a transcript
of all the testimony and evidence presented and
of the court's charge to the jury. Justice Douglas'
opinion noted that the decision rested on the
federal statutory scheme rather than upon con-
stitutional requirements. The Chief Justice and
justices Brennan and Stewart joined in Justice
Goldberg's concurring opinion, stating that full
transcripts should be provided without limitation
to all federal indigent appellants, even if appellate
counsel was also trial counsel. Justice Clark con-
curred in the result, and Justice Harlan dissented.
Right to Counsel-Lee v. United States, 322
F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1963). See Confessions, supra.
Right to Counsel-Anderson v. North Carolina,
221 F. Supp. 930 (W.D.N.C. 1963). Defendant
was convicted in a North Carolina state court on
his plea of guilty of assault with intent to rape.
On petition for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner
contended that he was effectively denied his right
to counsel. After holding two evidentiary hearings,
the District Court for the Western District of
North Carolina issued the writ, ordering that
petitioner be released unless the State elects to
try him for either the capital offense of rape or
the lesser felony within a reasonable time, holding
that where petitioner, under indictment for the
capital offense of rape, had originally pleaded not
guilty to rape, but later that same day had pleaded
guilty to the lesser offense of assault with intent
to rape after a conference with the state solicitor
and members of his staff, from which conference
petitioner's court-appointed counsel was absent
but to which he consented, petitioner was without
the assistance of counsel in negotiating a com-
promise with the solicitor; and since petitioner
lacked counsel during the conference-a critical
stage of the proceedings against him-those pro-
ceedings were constitutionally defective, and
habeas corpus must issue.
Right to Counsel-People v. Ibarra, 34 Cal.
Rptr. 863 (1963). Defendant was convicted of
unlawful possession of heroin, and the District
Court of Appeal affirmed. On appeal, defendant
contended that illegally seized evidence was ad-
mitted against him, and that his court-appointed
counsel's failure to object to its admission demon-
strated such a lack of knowledge of law that repre-
sentation by that counsel failed to satisfy de-
fendant's right to effective assistance of counsel.
The Supreme Court of California reversed, hold-
ing that since no objection was made to admission
of the evidence now complained of, the issue of
whether it was lawfully obtained could not be
resolved on appeal; that in order to justify relief
on the ground that counsel provided unconstitu-
tionally ineffective representation, it must appear
that counsel's lack of diligence or competence
reduced the trial to a farce or sham; and where
defendant's counsel, a deputy public defender,
did not object to admission of heroin because he
did not know of the long-standing, easily-dis-
coverable California rule that permitted defendant
to challenge the legality of the search and seizure
even though he denied that the heroin was taken
from him and asserted no proprietary interest in
the premises entered, counsel's failure to object
reduced defendant's trial to a farce and a sham,
since it precluded resolution of the crucial factual
issues supporting defendant's primary defense;
and consequently, defendant was denied effective
assistance of counsel and his conviction must be
reversed.
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Right to Counsel-People v. Sigal, 34 Cal.
Rptr. 767 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963). See Confessions,
supra.
Right to Counsel-Smith v. Crouse, 386 P.2d
295 (Kan. 1963). Defendant was convicted of
second degree burglary, and the Kansas Supreme
Court dismissed his pro se appeal. On appeal from
denial by the district court of Leavenworth County
of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, defendant
contended that the district court's failure to
appoint appellate counsel and the Kansas Supreme
Court's order denying his motion for appointment
of counsel constituted deprivation of his right to be
represented by court-appointed counsel in his
appeal from the conviction and sentence. [That
appeal had been dismissed for noncompliance with
certain procedures which could not be timely
complied with by counsel subsequently retained
by defendant.] The Supreme Court of Kansas
affirmed, holding that since in 1960 when de-
fendant's request for court-appointed appellate
counsel was denied there was no state or federal
statute and no rule or decision of the Kansas
court or of the United States Supreme Court
requiring appointment of appellate counsel for
defendant, that denial complied with the then
existing law; and in absence of a clear statement by
the United States Supreme Court that Douglas
v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (abstracted at 54 J.
CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 193 (1963), requiring appoint-
ment of counsel on appeal for indigent defendants
in state courts, was to be retroactively applied,
the Kansas Court would decline so to construe
that case.
Right to Counsel-In re Palmer, 124 N.W.2d
773 (Mich. 1963). Petitioner pleaded guilty to a
charge of second degree murder, a non-capital
offense, and was sentenced to life imprisonment
in 1942. On petition for writ of habeas corpus and
ancillary writ of certiorari, petitioner contended
that he was deprived of his right to counsel at
trial in violation of the due process requirement
enunciated by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, abstracted at 54 J. CRm. L., C. & P.S. 193
(1963). In an opinion in which two judges con-
curred announcing the judgment of the Court,
the Supreme Court of Michigan discharged peti-
tioner and remanded him to the Sheriff of Macomb
County for further proceedings [presumably to
allow the State to retry him if it wished], holding
that the Gideon case restored the previously sound,
constitutionally enunciated principle of Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), by overruling the
"fundamental fairness" rule of Belts v. Brady,
316 U.S. 455 (1942); that because the Michigan
Court held, in People v. Winterheld, 115 N.W.2d
80 (Mich. 1962), abstracted at 54 J. CRm. L., C.
& P.S. 83 (1963), that Mapp v. Ohio applied retro-
actively and because the United States Supreme
Court vacated and remanded ten pre-Gideon state
criminal judgments for further consideration in
light of Gideon, the Gideon. case would be given
retroactive effect in Michigan state courts; and
that since waiver of the right to counsel could not
be presumed from the record's silence with regard
to counsel, the writ of habeas corpus must issue.
The Court noted that only cases arising during the
years 1942-1947 would be involved, inasmuch as
since 1947 denial of counsel in felony cases in
violation of state provisions constituted reversible
error, and consequently the argument that retro-
active application of Gideon would "open the
jailhouse door" was not applicable in Michigan.
Five Judges concurred in the result without opin-
ion, and one concurred in the result on the ground
that it was compelled by the state constitutional
right to counsel provision without regard to the
application of Gideon.
Right to Counsel-State v. Nelson, 196 A.2d 52
(N.H. 1963). See Arrest, Search and Seizure,
supra.
Right to Counsel-State --. Miller, 194 A.2d
729 (N.J. 1963). After defendant, charged with
murder, moved for an order permitting his court-
appointed counsel to engage a private investi-
gator at the expense of the county, the trial court
denied the motion, and the Supreme Court of
New Jersey granted leave to appeal. Defendant,
an indigent, contended that his counsel should
have the services of a private investigator to find
and interview possible witnesses. The Supreme
Court of New Jersey reversed with directions for
entry of order in harmony with its opinion, hold-
ing that although the prosecution had been
"commendably cooperative," the county should
nonetheless provide defendant with a private
investigator to find and interview persons who
were present when the offense was allegedly
committed. The Court noted that defendant's
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counsel should see that the investigation was
conducted within reasonable limits.
Right to Counsel-People v. Donovan, 193
N.E.2d 628 (N.Y. 1963). See Confessions, supra.
Right to Free Transcript-Hardy v. United
States, 84 Sup. Ct. 424 (1964). See Right to Coun-
sel, supra.
Right to Trial-Letters v. Comnnwealth, 193
N.E.2d 578 (Mass. 1963). See Guilty Plea-Coer-
cion, supra.
Scientific Evidence-Color Photographs-Peo-
ple v. Deriso, 35 Cal. Rptr. 134 (Dist. Ct. App.
1963); State v. Morris, 157 So. 2d 728 (La. 1963).
Two courts have recently considered the question
whether the admission in evidence of colored
photographs of a homicide victim, including
some depicting an autopsy, constituted prejudi-
cial error.
In People v. Deriso, the California District
Court of Appeal rejected defendant's contention
that color photographs and slides showing the
murder victims' bodies at the scene of the crime
and during autopsy were improperly admitted,
holding that since the photographs of the scene
were used to illustrate a criminalist's testimony
regarding the location and nature of blood stains
and other physical evidence, and the autopsy
surgeon needed the photographs of the autopsy to
show the basis for his opinions concerning the
wounds inflicted, the photographs complained of
were properly admitted in the trial court's dis-
cretion, inasmuch as their evidentiary value out-
weighed their possible prejudicial effect.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana in the Morris
case found the 15 color slides showing the victim's
body prior to and while undergoing an autopsy
devoid of real evidentiary value and thus reversed
defendant's conviction for murder, holding that
where the avowed purpose of showing the slides
was to demonstrate that the deceased's various
internal organs were healthy and did not con-
tribute to his death, the slides had no probative
value which would render them admissible over
claim of prejudice, inasmuch as the average lay
juror "would not know a healthy organ from an
unhealthy one and the showing of the pictures
would mean nothing to him."
Search and Seizure-Fahy v. Connecticut, 84
Sup. Ct. 229 (1963). Prior to the Supreme Court's
decision of Mapp v. Ohio, petitioner was con-
victed in a Connecticut state court of wilfully
injuring a public building by painting swastikas
on a synagogue. After Mapp was handed down,
the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors af-
firmed, holding that although Mapp applied to
cases pending on appeal in Connecticut courts
when that decision was rendered, and although
unconstitutionally obtained evidence was used
against petitioner, admission of the evidence was
merely harmless error. State v. Fahy, 183 A.2d
256 (Conn. 1962). On certiorari, petitioner con-
tended that admission of the admittedly illegally
seized evidence-a jar of paint and a paint brush
obtained from his car-was prejudicial to him.
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Warren,
the Supreme Court of the United States reversed
and remanded, holding that since there was a
"reasonable possibility that the evidence com-
plained of might have contributed to the con-
viction," admission of the illegally seized evidence
constituted prejudicial error regardless of the
presence of sufficient independent evidence to
sustain the conviction. The Court noted that use
of the illegally obtained evidence precluded
petitioner from arguing below that since the illegal
seizure induced his admissions and confession,
these statements should have been excluded. In
an opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan, Justices Harlan,
Clark, Stewart and White dissented, stating that
the issue presented by the case, but not reached
by the majority, was simply whether the Four-
teenth Amendment prevented state application
of a harmless-error rule to criminal cases regarding
unconstitutionally seized evidence, and that the
majority avoided this issue by disregarding the
finding of the highest court of Connecticut that
the evidence was without prejudicial effect.
[In discussing petitioner's possible argument
that his statements might be excludible if induced
by confrontation with the illegally seized evidence,
the majority stated that "such a line of inquiry is
permissible," citing, inter alia, Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, abstracted at 54 J.
Cmu. L., C. & P.S. 189 (1963). This indicates
the inclination of five Justices to apply Wong
Sun to the states.]
Search and Seizure-People v. Ibarra, 34 Cal.
Rptr. 863 (1963): See Right to Counsel, supra.
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Search and Seizure-People v. Walker, 195
N.E.2d 654 (Ifl. 1964). Defendant's motion to
quash a search warrant and suppress evidence
obtained pursuant thereto was granted by the
trial court. On writ of error by the People, de-
fendant contended that the warrant was defective
and the evidence inadmissible because the in-
formation upon which the warrant was issued was
illegally obtained. The Supreme Court of Illinois
reversed, holding that a police officer who made
an illegal policy bet and at that time observed
gambling paraphernalia was lawfully on the
premises, inasmuch as he did not affirmatively
misrepresent his identity and was under no ob-
ligation voluntarily to identify himself as a police-
man; and consequently, the warrant to search
those premises, which was issued the following day
pursuant to the officer's observations, was valid,
and the evidence lawfully obtained.
Search and Seizure-People v. Zeravich, 195
N.E.2d 612 (Ill. 1964). After defendant was in-
dicted for burglary and theft, his pre-trial motion
to suppress evidence obtained by an illegal search
was granted. On direct appeal by the People
[entertained on the ground that a construction of
the constitution was involved, ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 38, par. 747 (1961)], defendant contended that
a search of his person which yielded money sought
to be introduced as .evidence against him was
unlawful, inasmuch as it was conducted without a
warrant by officers who had stopped him for a
minor traffic violation. The Supreme Court of
Illinois reversed and remanded with instructions
to overrule the motion to suppress, holding that
where the officers who stopped defendant's car
to ticket him for driving with obstructed vision
noticed that he matched the description, received
by police communique, of a suspected felon, the
officers could reasonably conclude that defendant
was not merely a traffic violator but a dangerous
criminal as well; and consequently, under the cir-
cumstances, the officers' search of defendant's
person was reasonable to insure their own safety
and to prevent the possibility of an attempted
escape. Justice Daily dissented, stating that the
Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the direct
appeal because no question of constitutional
construction was presented, the only question
being the factual one whether or not the search
was reasonable.
Search and Seizure-State v. Hudson County
News Co., 196 A.2d 225 (N.J. 1963). See Obscen-
ity, supra.
Search and Seizure-Commonwealth ex rel.
Wilson v. Rundle, 194 A.2d 143 (Pa. 1963). After
petitioner was convicted of felony murder, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed and the
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Subsequently, Mapp v. Ohio was decided. On
appeal from the denial without hearing by the
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas of
his application for writ of habeas corpus, peti-
tioner contended that he was entitled to a hearing
on his petition, and, inter alia, that evidence
obtained through unreasonable search and seizure
was used against him. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania affirmed, holding that since all issues
presented by petitioner's application involved
either facts conceded by the Commonwealth or
pure questions of law, no material questions of
fact were presented and the lower court's failure
to hold a hearing on the petition was not error;
that the reliance of all parties in most pre-Afapp
trials, including that of petitioner, upon Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), which permitted the
states to convict on the basis of illegally seized
evidence, militated against a construction of the
effect of Mapp which would vitiate a trial con-
ducted in compliance with what was, at the time
of trial, the law of the land; and since the basic
purpose of Mapp was deterrence of future unlaw-
ful police conduct, Mapp's exclusionary rule would
not be retroactively applied to upset judgments
which now offend the Mapp rule but which, like
petitioner's, became final prior to the decision of
Mapp.
Search and Seizure-State v. Lowden, 387 P.2d
240 (Utah 1963). Defendant was convicted of
second degree murder. On appeal, defendant con-
tended that evidence obtained by an unreasonable
search of his motel room was erroneously admitted
against him. The Supreme Court of Utah affirmed,
holding that where police officers, who were in-
vestigating a series of felonies and received a tip
(the nature and source of which they would not
reveal) indicating that defendant was involved,
requested and received the motel proprietor's
permission to enter defendant's room, wherein
they found and put back an identifiably stolen
pistol, and later frisked defendant for weapons
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upon his return and searched his room without
arresting defendant and without a search warrant
but with his apparent consent, the trial court's
determination that the search, which yielded
other stolen goods, was reasonable would not be
upset because it was not "clearly wrong." The
Court noted that the question whether- evidence
was obtained by an unconstitutionally unreason-
able search was "primarily for the trial court upon
a survey of the whole situation, having in mind
both the rights of citizens and the exigencies of
police work." An opinion by Chief Justice Henriod,
concurring in the result, severely criticizes Mapp
v. Ohio.
Search and Seizure-Waiver by Spouse-Statev.
Shephard, 124 N.W.2d 712 (Iowa 1963). Defendant
was convicted of second degree murder for killing
her newborn infant. On appeal, defendant con-
tended that her constitutional rights were violated
by the trial court's failure to suppress evidence and
testimony secured by means of an illegal search and
seizure, and that the evidence failed to show that
defendant murdered her child. The Supreme Court
of Iowa affirmed, holding that the evidence sup-
ported the trial court's finding that defendant's
husband freely and voluntarily consented to the
search complained of; that since the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments were designed to protect
a person and his property from arbitrary and un-
reasonable searches and seizures rather than to help
a guilty party escape the consequences of his act, if
the party in possession or control of premises and
property voluntarily consents to a search, the right
of privacy is not invaded, and the fact that the
search may yield evidence which incriminates an
absent party who has an equal right to possession
or control does not affect the reasonableness or
legality of the search; that consequently, the search
consented to by defendant's husband who was then
in possession and control of the premises searched
was legal and the evidence obtained by that search
was properly admitted against defendant; and
since, from the evidence, the jury could have found
that the death of the baby was brought about by
defendant's allowing it to be born at home on a
cold bathroom floor under unfavorable conditions
and to remain on the floor unattended for some
time when excellent free medical care was available,
the inference of malice essential to the conviction
was justified.
Self-Incrimination-DeLuna v. United States,
324 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1963). The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit denied the Government's peti-
tion for rehearing, thus adhering to its earlier hold-
ing that the Fifth Amendment prohibits all
reference, even by a co-defendant's counsel, to a
defendant's failure to testify. See DeLuna v. United
States, 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962), abstracted at
54 J. Cmrm. L., C. & P.S. 196 (1963).
Self-Incrimination-People v. Donovan, 193
N.E.2d 628 (N.Y. 1963). See Confessions, supra.
Self-Incrimination-Walton v. City of Roanoke,
133 S.E.2d 315 (Va. 1963). Defendant was con-
victed of driving while under the influence of al-
cohol in violation of a city ordinance. On appeal,
defendant contended that since under the "implied
consent" law [VA. CODE §18.1-55] defendant was
compelled to give evidence, consisting of blood,
against himself in violation of the state and federal
constitutional privileges against self-incrimination,
the trial court erred in admitting as evidence testi-
mony concerning a chemical analysis of defendant's
blood to determine its alcoholic content. [Pertinent
subsections of the statute in substance provided:
that anyone operating a motor vehicle upon Vir-
ginia highways is deemed to consent to, and shall be
entitled to, a chemical analysis of his blood to de-
termine alcoholic content if arrested for a state
statute or city ordinance involving drunken driv-
ing; that refusal to submit to a test is not evidence
and shall not be commented upon at trial; and that
refusal to submit to a test constitutes grounds for
revocation of driver's license.] Noting that the
"right" to operate a motor vehicle on Virginia
highways was a privilege subject to reasonable reg-
ulation under the State's police power in the in-
terests of public safety and welfare, the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed, holding that
assuming arguendo that, despite authority to the
contrary, the Fifth Amendment privilege ["no
person.., shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself"] applied to the
stafes through the Fourteenth Amendment, that
constitutional prohibition was restricted to oral
testimony and did not preclude the use of one's
body or bodily secretions and the results of their
chemical analyses; that the State constitutional
provision [VA. CoNsT. art. I, §8, providing, inter
alia, that no person shall "be compelled in any
criminal proceeding to give evidence against him-
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self"] was identical in scope to the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege, despite the use of the word "evi-
dence" in the former provision while "witness" is
used in the latter, inasmuch as the history and
purpose of the state constitutional privilege so in-
dicated; that defendant had a choice of either
allowing the test to be made or refusing it; and
consequently, §18.1-55 neither required defendant
to take a blood test nor compelled him to give evi-
dence against himself in violation of the federal or
state privilege against self-incrimination.
Sentencing-People v. Morse, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201
(1964). Defendant was convicted of two counts of
first degree murder and was sentenced to death. On
automatic appeal, defendant contended that the
trial court by specific instruction thereon allowed
the jury to consider incompetent material in the
penalty phase of the trial. Reversing its prior posi-
tion on the issue, the California Supreme Court re-
versed as to penalty and affirmed in all other re-
spects, holding that the jury's consideration of the
possibility of parole by the Adult Authority, in-
cluding the possibility of improper parole and
statistics regarding length of time actually served
by "life prisoners," tended to allow the jury to
consider speculative matters outside its province
aind thus to prevent the jury from placing proper
emphasis on the particular defendant as he is at
this time; that the jury's knowledge that the trial
judge and Governor had power to reduce a death
sentence to life imprisonment tended to weaken the
jury's sense of responsibility for the imposition of
sentence; that the possible future roles of the Adult
Authority, trial judge, and Governor thus have no
proper bearing on the issue which the jury must de-
cide, and therefore should not be considered in the
penalty phase of a first degree murder case; and
since it was reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to defendant as to penalty would have
been reached in the absence of the erroneous in-
structions calling the jury's attention to the incom-
petent material and allowing them to consider it,
the penalty phase of defendant's conviction must
be reversed.
Sentencing-Burnette v. State, 157 So. 2d 65 (Fla.
1963). Defendant was convicted of first degree
murder without recommendation of mercy. On
appeal, defendant contended that the trial court's
statement to the jury, in response to their question
regarding the possible consequences of a sentence
of life imprisonment, that a convict is eligible to
submit an application for parole after serving six
months in prison, permitted the jury to consider
incompetent information in determining whether or
not to recommend mercy in violation of defendant's
right to have the question of mercy determined in
the same fair and impartial manner as the question
of guilt. The Supreme Court of Florida reversed
and remanded, holding that due to the gravity of
the issues presented by the record, defendant's
contention would be considered in the interests of
justice even though defendant failed to object or
except to the court's response to the jury's in-
quiry; that since in capital cases a Florida jury
decides penalty as well as guilt or innocence, discus-
sion of the question of parole could result in preju-
dice in a capital case; that matters of probation
and parole are delegated by the legislature to cer-
tain state officials, and the province of the jury
does not include consideration of such matters in
their deliberations; and since the jurors in de-
fendant's case probably did not know that it was
improper to allow consideration of possibility of
parole to affect their verdict, the court's remark
would be deemed prejudicial to defendant. The
Court advised that, in the future, as part of his
general charge regarding recommendation of mercy
in every capital case, the trial judge should ad-
monish that provisions for probation, parole,
pardon, or commutation are administered by public
officials and that such considerations must not
enter into the jury's determination of the question
whether or not to recommend mercy.
Statutory Construction-Burglary-Dawalt v
State, 156 So. 2d 769 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
Defendant was convicted of entering a building
with intent to commit a misdemeanor. On appeal,
defendant contended that the information, which
charged that he entered without breaking a tele-
phone booth within a building with intent to com-
mit petit larceny, failed to charge an offense. The
District Court of Appeal of Florida reversed,
holding that although under the pertinent statute
[FLA. STAT. ANN. §810.05] a telephone booth
may perhaps be a "building" if located outside
another building, the booth which defendant
was charged with entering was not a "building"
within the statute, since it was situated inside
another building; and consequently, by classifying
the telephone booth rather than the building with-
in which it was located as the building entered, the
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information was defective for failure to state a
crime under Florida law.
Statutory Construction-Burglary-People v.
Peck, 194 N.E.2d 245 (Ill. 1963). Defendant's mo-
tion to quash an indictment charging him with
burglary was granted by the trial court. On writ of
error by the People, defendant contended that
since the indictment failed to allege a specific
person whose property defendant intended to steal
when he unlawfully entered a building, it violated
his constitutional right to know the nature and
cause of the accusation against him to enable him
to prepare a defense. The Supreme Court of
Illinois reversed and remanded with directions to
overrule the motion to quash, holding that since
the burglary statute [ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, par.
19-1 (1961)] proscribed the unlawful entry of a
building "with intent to commit therein a felony
or theft," a generalized intent to commit a felony
or theft rather than a particularized intent to
commit such crime against a specific person must
be proved to warrant conviction for burglary, and
consequently, failure to allege the person from
whom defendant intended to steal did not render
the indictment void for failure to give him suffi-
cient information to prepare his defense. The Court
noted that People v. Picard, 120 N.E. 546 (Ill.
1918) was overruled to the extent that it asserts a
contrary view.
Statutory Construction-Embezzlement-Com-
monwealth v. Shafer, 195 A.2d 825 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1963). Defendant's motion to quash an indictment
charging him with embezzlement by a tax collector
was granted. On appeal by the Commonwealth,
defendant contended that the statute under which
he was indicted, PA. CODE §823, which proscribed
embezzlement by tax collectors, did not apply to
him, a vendor required to collect sales taxes and
turn them over to the Commonwealth. The Su-
perior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed, holding
that both the language and historical source of §823
indicated that the section was intended to apply to
public officials duly elected or appointed to collect
taxes rather than to a person such as defendant
who, although charged with collecting and turning
over sales taxes on items sold by the corporation of
which he was president, did not thereby become a
public official but rather was manifestly a taxpayer
incidentally burdened with the duty of withholding
and paying over taxes.
Statutory Construction-Escape--United States
v. Person, 223 F. Supp. 982 (S.D. Cal. 1963). De-
fendant was indicted for escape from federal cus-
tody in violation of 18 U.S.C. §751. The District
Court for the Southern District of California found
defendant not guilty, holding that where defend-
ant, who had not yet been paroled, failed to re-
turn after a five-hour night pass to the Federal
Pre-Release Guidance Center, to which place he
had been transferred after serving time in federal
institutions and from which he was away each day
to go to a job, defendant was not in "custody"
within the meaning of the escape statute, and thus
must be found not guilty.
Statutory Construction-Federal Kidnaping Act
-Aircraft Piracy-United States v. Healy, 84 Sup.
Ct. 553 (1964). Defendants were indicted for vio-
lating (Count 1) the Federal Kidnaping Act, 18
U.S.C. §1201, and (Count 2) the 1961 "aircraft
piracy" amendment to §902 of the Federal Avia-
tion Act, 49 U.S.C. §1472(i), by kidnaping at gun-
point the pilot of a private airplane and compelling
him to transport them to Cuba. On direct appeal
by the Government from the District Court's dis-
missal of the entire indictment, defendant con-
tended that the Federal Kidnaping Act applied
only if the kidnaping was committed for pecuniary
benefit, and that the aircraft piracy provision was
limited to commercial airliners. In a unanimous
opinion written by Mr. Justice Harlan, the United
States Supreme Court reversed and remanded with
instructions to reinstate both counts of the indict-
ment, holding that since a 1934 amendment added
the words "or otherwise" to the Federal Kidnap-
ing Act, which now encompasses the kidnaping of
persons held "for ransom or reward or otherwise,"
nonpecuniary motive did not preclude prosecution
under the statute as amended; that the aircraft
piracy provision itself, making it a federal offense
to exercise control by threat of force of "an air-
craft in flight in air commerce," and its relation
to the rest of the Federal Aviation Act, e.g., §101
[49 U.S.C. §1301(4)], which defines "air commerce"
in such a way as not to exclude private aircraft, as
well as the legislative history of the statute, showed
that both private and commercial aircraft were
protected; and consequently, each count of the in-
dictment properly charged a federal offense.
Statutory Construction-Loitering-State v.
Caez, 195 A.2d 496 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1963). De-
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
fendant was convicted of loitering in violation of a
city ordinance. On appeal, defendant contended
that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague
and indefinite. The Appellate Division of the Su-
perior Court of New Jersey reversed, holding that
since the ordinance merely used the word "loiter"
but did not define it or set forth any standard by
which it could be determined whether one was
"loitering" in violation of the ordinance, and since
in absence of such clarification activities obviously
not intended to be covered by the ordinance, e.g.,
window shopping, would be punishable, the ordi-
nance, so far as it punished loitering, was invalid.
Statutory Construction-Lottery-Blackburn v.
Ippolito, 156 So. 2d 550 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
Petitioner, a supermarket manager, was arrested
for operating a lottery in violation of FLA. STAT.
ANN. §849.09, and was discharged upon proceed-
ings below for habeas corpus. On appeal by re-
spondent county sheriff and the State, petitioner
contended that while two elements of a proscribed
lottery-a prize and an award thereof by chance
-were present in the promotional game which he
operated, the third essential element-considera-
tion-was absent, inasmuch as the consideration
required for conviction was pecuniary considera-
tion given for a chance at a prize, and the game in
question involved no pecuniary consideration.
Noting that the question was one of first impres-
sion in Florida, the Florida District Court of Ap-
peal reversed with directions to quash the writ of
habeas corpus and remand petitioner, holding that
the consideration essential to conviction need not
be pecuniary, but need only be such as would estab-
lish a simple contract; that such consideration
would exist even if no benefit accrued to petitioner
so long as some detriment was suffered by the
participants in the game; and where under the
promotional scheme operated by petitioner persons
were eligible for prizes alloted by chance drawing if
they merely registered their names on cards which
were punched weekly without pecuniary obliga-
tion and appeared in the supermarket parking lot
15 minutes before the weekly drawing, their con-
duct constituted consideration, inasmuch as they
suffered a detriment of time and money in having
their cards punched and appearing for the drawing,
and because they were subjected to the sales appeal
of petitioner's merchandise; and consequently the
lower court erred in holding that petitioner's pro-
motional scheme was not a lottery, and the order
granting habeas corpus must be reversed.
Statutory Construction-Sodomy-Riey v. Gar-
reit, 133 S.E.2d 367 (Ga. 1963). Petitioner, serving
consecutive sentences for convictions on two counts
of an indictment charging him with sodomy with
a female, petitioned for mandamus to compel the
Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles to
consider his application for parole. On writ of error
from the Fulton County Superior Court's denial of
relief, petitioner contended that since he had
served more than one-third of the minimum sen-
tence imposed on Count 1 and the sentence im-
posed on Count 2 was void because the facts
alleged in Count 2 did not constitute a crime under
Georgia law, and since the Board erroneously re-
fused to consider his application for parole, man-
damus to compel consideration should issue. The
Supreme Court of Georgia reversed and issued the
writ, holding that in construing a criminal statute
fairly and reasonably susceptible of two construc-
tions, the statute must be construed strictly against
the state and in favor of the accused; that under
this rule of construction, the sodomy statute [GA.
CODE §26-5901), defining sodomy as "the carnal
knowledge and connection against the order of
nature, by man with man, or in the same unnatural
manner with woman," did not proscribe the act al-
leged in Count 2 of the indictment under which de-
fendant was convicted (an unnatural act of copula-
tion between a man and a woman per linguam in
vagina), since the phrase "in the same unnatural
manner,"--which could refer either to the words
"against the order of nature," which construction
would make defendant's act criminal, or to the
words "by man," which construction would neces-
sitate the use of the male sexual organ and would
not cover defendant's act-must be construed in
the latter way, strictly against the state; that
although collateral attack on a judgment, such as
mandamus, cannot be generally substituted for
direct attack, this rule does not apply where the
judgment was not merely erroneous or voidable
but, as here, was utterly void for absence of a law
proscribing the act in question; and consequently,
since the judgment of conviction on Count 2 was
void and petitioner had served, on Count 1, more
than the term required by the rules of the Board in
order to be eligible for parole, mandamus would
issue to compel the Board to consider petititioner's
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application for parole from the judgment of convic-
tion on Count 1.
Statutory Construction-Unauthorized Use of
Motor Vehicle-State v. Edmonson, 371 S.W.2d
273 (Mo. 1963). Defendant was convicted of driv-
ing a motor vehicle without the owner's permission
in violation of Mo. STAT. ANN. §560.175. On ap-
peal, defendant contended, inter alia, that his act
of steering the car in question while it was being
pushed along the street without its motor running
by another car did not constitute "driving, using
and operating" the car within the meaning of the
statute. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed,
holding that guiding the car along a public street
while it was being pushed by another car did con-
stitute "driving, using and operating," since it was
not necessary for the car to be running under its
own power, inasmuch as any and all acts reason-
ably necessary to be performed in moving a motor
vehicle from one place to another or fairly inci-
dental to the ordinary course of its operation were
encompassed by the statutory language.
Traffic Violations-People v. Lewis, 194 N.E.2d
831 (N.Y. 1963); State v'. Brown, 196 A.2d 133
(R.I. 1963). The highest courts of two states have
recently considered whether a charge of violating
a statute prohibiting, inter alia, the driving of a
motor vehicle "at a speed greater than is reasonable
and prudent under the conditions and having re-
gard to the actual and potential hazards then exist-
ing" was unconstitutionally vague.
The New York Court of Appeals answered in
the negative in the Lewis case. Noting that al-
though the defendant's act was a traffic infraction
rather than a crime, the rules of criminal law were
applicable to his prosecution, the Court held that
the above-quoted language of the statute in ques-
tion [N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW §1180(a)]
was not unconstitutionally vague and indefinite,
since the language rendered a motorist guilty only
if, in view of existing conditions and reasonably
foreseeable hazards, he was chargeable with ordi-
nary negligence with respect to speed.
In State v. Brown, the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island upheld defendant's contention that a com-
plaint alleging a violation in the language of R.I.
GEN. LAwS §34-14-1, identical to the language of
the New York statute, was so vague as to violate
his right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him. Two subsections
[§§34-14-2 & 34-14-3] of §34-14, under neither of
which defendant was charged, specified certain
standards and evidentiary presumptions for de-
termining whether speed is unreasonable or im-
prudent. The Court held that all three subsections
must be considered as a whole, and that the com-
plaint, which merely alleged the language of
§34-14-1 without reference to either of the stand-
ard-setting subsections, failed to give defendant
adequate notice of the nature of the accusation.
Witnesses-State v. Solhen, 371 S.W.2d 328
(Mo. 1963). Defendant was convicted of first
degree robbery by means of a dangerous and deadly
weapon and was sentenced as a fourth offender.
On appeal, defendant contended that the trial
court committed prejudicial error in not permitting
defendant's counsel to show, by cross-examination
of the State's chief witness, who had identified de-
fendant as the robber on direct examination, that
the witness had refused to discuss the case with
defense counsel on advice of the prosecutor. Not-
ing that the case was one of first impression in
Missouri and that no case precisely in point had
been cited from any jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court of Missouri reversed and remanded, holding
that since the proferred line of cross-examination
would have tended to show the witness's willing-
ness to cooperate with and follow the instructions
of the prosecutor and her hostility toward de-
fendant, which matters may properly be the sub-
ject of cross-examination because they bear on the
credit which should be given the direct testimony,
the trial court's refusal to allow defense counsel to
pursue the proferred inquiry was prejudicial error,
inasmuch as it effectively prevented all examina-
tion as to the witness's bias and prejudice.
Witnesses-State v. Carroll. 123 N.W.2d 659
(N.D. 1963). See Expert Witnesses, supra.
